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Brexit and the 2017 UK General Election  
 
SARA B. HOBOLT 
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The 2017 UK General Election came less than a year after one of the most significant political 
events in recent British and European politics history: the referendum decision of British voters 
to exit the European Union (EU). The snap election that was meant to strengthen the 
Conservative government’s hand in the UK–EU Brexit negotiations, and Prime Minister 
Theresa May’s position within her party and in parliament, resulted instead in a diminished 
Conservative minority government. Given the major political event that preceded the election, 
it was foreseeable that it might result in new patterns of voting behaviour. What was surprising, 
however, is that the 2017 election saw the decline of multi-party politics in Britain, despite the 
Brexit divide cutting across party lines. The parties that were most united in offering distinct 
positions on Brexit – the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) with its ‘hard Brexit’ 
approach and the pro-EU Liberal Democrats and Greens with their promise of a second 
referendum – all lost votes. In contrast, the two major parties, that promised to honour 
referendum results but were deeply internally divided on the nature of post-Brexit UK–EU 
relations, were rewarded with the largest combined vote share in any election since 1970. How 
did an election in the midst of the Brexit debate lead to the strengthening of two-party politics 
in Britain? Was this outcome a signal that voters were uniting behind the decision to leave the 
European Union? And, how did the outcome of this election affect the ongoing Brexit 
negotiations? 
 
                                                 
 The author would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of the ESRC Brexit Priority 
Grant (ES/R000573/1) and the European Research Council Consolidator Grant (ERC GA 647835/ 
EUDEMOS). Moreover, this contribution has benefited from insightful comments by Emanuele 
Massetti and Toni Rodon. 
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These questions are examined in this contribution. I argue that despite the ostensible consensus 
on Brexit by the two major parties, the public – alongside parliamentarians and political parties 
– remained as divided as ever. An analysis of individual-level data from the British Election 
Study (BES) shows that while traditional economic left–right values continued to be the main 
driver of electoral behaviour in British politics, other key political fault lines that were apparent 
in the Brexit referendum were also present in this election: the younger, progressive and 
degree-educated voters flocked to Labour, whereas the Conservative voter base was 
significantly older and more socially conservative. Moreover, the Brexit vote itself had an 
independent effect on vote choice, as the Conservative Party attracted more Leave voters and 
benefited from the collapse of UKIP, whereas Remain voters were more likely to vote for the 
Labour Party.  
 
The main conclusion of this contribution is therefore that while the 2017 election resulted in 
the resurgence of two-party politics based on contestation along the classic economic left–right 
dimension, electoral behaviour in Britain – like elsewhere in Europe – is also driven by salient 
cultural concerns (De Vries, 2017; Kriesi et al., 2008). This reflects in part the divide created 
by the Brexit referendum that mobilized an underlying fault line between socially liberal 
cosmopolitans – mostly young and well-educated - and older, less educated socially 
conservative voters and which continues to reverberate (Hobolt, 2016; Jennings and Stoker, 
2017). The election also had implications for Britain’s negotiations on its future relationship 
with the EU. The surprise outcome of the ballot weakened Mrs May’s position in her party and 
within Parliament, and this made it more difficult for the government to present a united and 
coherent position in the UK–EU negotiations. Rather than strengthening the British 
government’s hands in the Brexit negotiations, the 2017 election illustrated that Britain remains 
deeply divided over its future in the EU and in the world – in the electorate, in parliament and 
even within the government itself.  
 
I. The Surprise 2017 General Election 
Both the announcement and the outcome of the June 2017 UK General Election were a surprise. 
The snap election was called by Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, who had been 
appointed leader of the party and the government in July 2016, after former Prime Minister 
David Cameron resigned in response to the unexpected Brexit referendum outcome. While Mrs 
May had repeatedly ruled out a snap election, she nonetheless decided in April 2017 to call one 
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shortly after triggering Article 50 to start the exit negotiations with the EU. Ostensibly the 
reason for the election was to strengthen Britain’s hand in the Brexit negotiation by increasing 
the government’s parliamentary mandate. At the time, the snap election seemed like a clever 
tactical decision as the Conservative party had a sizeable lead in the opinion polls of up to 20 
percentage points over Labour and was widely expected to win a large majority in parliament 
(Prosser, 2018). However, as the campaign progressed Labour recovered ground and finished 
close behind the Conservatives. Shifts of this magnitude in voting intention is highly unusual 
during campaigns and indicate are more volatile electorate than in the past (Mellon et al., 2018). 
 
One key driver of vote switching during the campaign was the public’s perception of the two 
contenders for the premiership, Theresa May and Labour’s Jeremy Corbyn. The Conservative 
campaigned focused heavily on Mrs May as a strong and reliable leader who would deliver the 
best deal for Britain in the Brexit negotiations. But she turned out to be a much weaker 
campaigner than expected, while the Labour leader became increasingly popular during the 
campaign. Mr Corbyn was viewed by most commentators – including many of his own MPs – 
as too left-wing and largely unelectable, yet his favourability ratings improved steadily during 
the campaign (Mellon et al., 2018). Moreover, the Labour Party chose to focus their campaign 
on a popular anti-austerity message of increased social spending and nationalization of key 
public services. 
 
Just like Cameron’s failed gamble to hold a referendum on British membership in the hope of 
mollifying divisions within his party and the electorate (Hobolt, 2016), May’s plan to 
strengthen her position within her party and in parliament and in the EU with a snap election 
did not pay off. The outcome was that the Conservatives lost their majority of seats and had to 
form a minority government with the support of the small right-wing Northern Irish party, the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). Theresa May emerged much weaker as a result. Table 1 
shows the vote and seat shares of the 2017 general election and the change in vote share since 









Table 1: 2017 UK General Election Results 









Conservative Party Theresa May 
Hard Brexit 
No 2nd referendum 
317 42.3 +5.5 
Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn 
“Jobs first Brexit” 
No 2nd referendum 








35 3.0 –1.7 
Liberal Democrats Tim Farron 
Soft Brexit 
2nd referendum on deal 





No 2nd referendum 
10 0.9 +0.3 
Sinn Féin Gerry Adams 
Special status for Northern 
Ireland within the EU 
7 0.7 +0.2 
Plaid Cymru Leanne Wood Soft Brexit 4 0.5 –0.1 










No 2nd referendum 
0 1.8 –10.8 
Note: This list excludes the (Conservative) Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, and the Independent Sylvia 
Hermon.  
Hard Brexit refers to the position of leaving the EU’s Single Market. Soft Brexit refers to staying in the EU’s Single Market 
and Customs Union. 
 
The most noticeable change in patterns of aggregate-level electoral support between 2015 and 
2017 is the move towards greater two-party dominance in 2017: 82.4 per cent voted for either 
a Conservative or a Labour candidate with a high turnout of 68.8 per cent. The dominance of 
the Conservatives and Labour was particularly pronounced in England where they won 87.3 
per cent of the vote. As Table 1 shows, this strengthening of the major parties was largely due 
to the collapse of UKIP that dropped from a vote share of over 12 per cent to under 2 per cent, 
but the other smaller parties (outside Northern Ireland) also lost votes.   
What is perhaps surprising is that voters did not reward the parties that took the most distinct 
positions on the Brexit question. Despite being the most unified pro-Brexit party, UKIP was 
abandoned by most of the 52 per cent of the British electorate who had voted to leave the 
European Union. UKIP’s decline can be attributed to the fact that the party’s major 
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campaigning issue of leaving the EU had been accepted by both major parties. Moreover, the 
referendum had allowed the Conservative Party to adopt a similar a hard-line position on 
reducing immigration post-Brexit; a position that had formed a major part of UKIP’s electoral 
appeal (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). According to the British Election Study, 73 per cent of 2015 
UKIP defectors voted for the Conservative Party in 2017 (57 per cent of all 2015 UKIP voters) 
(Mellon et al., 2018). Remainers also did not reward the Liberal Democrats or the Greens that 
had campaigned most strongly against a Hard Brexit and for a second referendum on the final 
Brexit deal, with the option of staying in the European Union (Liberal Democrats, 2017). Both 
parties lost voters, with 42 per cent of 2015 Green voters switching to Labour in the 2017 
election (Mellon et al., 2018).  
In contrast, the two major parties – the Conservatives and Labour – did not make Brexit 
a central theme of their campaign. Both parties were committed to honouring the referendum 
result, but they focused little on the details of their plans for Brexit, perhaps in part due to their 
internal divisions over the UK’s future relationship with the EU. Mrs May had already given a 
major speech on Brexit  that made it explicit that the government would seek to leave not only 
the EU itself, but also the Single Market and the Customs Union, and therefore ruled out a so-
called ‘Soft Brexit’. The emphasis during the campaign was therefore on the need for a ‘strong 
and stable government to get the best Brexit deal’ (Conservative Party, 2017). The Labour 
Party was promising a ‘Jobs First Brexit’, which some interpreted as a softer approach to the 
negotiations, but the party made no commitment to staying in the Single Market1 or any 
promises of a second referendum. Instead the focus of its campaign was a Britain ‘For the 
Many, not the Few’, which signalled a commitment to more redistribution and greater spending 
on the welfare state. 
Given the election result, it is tempting to conclude that voters had largely united behind 
Brexit and that the issue was unimportant in the election. However, the polling data show a 
very different story As shown in Figure 1, there has been very little movement in public opinion 
                                                 
1 Labour’s Manifesto was ambiguous on Single Market membership (Labour Party, 2017). The party 
promised to ‘scrap the Conservatives’ Brexit White Paper and replace it with fresh negotiating priorities 
that have a strong emphasis on retaining the benefits of the Single Market and the Customs Union’, thus 




on Brexit since the referendum when it comes to the question of whether Britain was right or 
wrong to vote to leave the EU. 
 
Figure 1: Was Britain Right or Wrong to Vote to Leave the EU? 
Source: YouGov/ What UK Thinks (https://whatukthinks.org/eu/)  
 
As Figure 1 shows, the public remains split down the middle when it comes to the question ‘in 
hindsight, do you think Britain was right or wrong to vote to leave the EU?’ Few people have 
changed their minds since the referendum and if anything the division between Remainers and 
Leavers is becoming more entrenched. Other research that I have conducted with collaborators 
on public attitudes and identities in the aftermath of Brexit reveals that around three-quarters 
of British citizens identify as either Remainers or Leavers, and these new identities cut across 
traditional party lines. More worryingly, our research shows that such identities go beyond 
political disagreement and translate into animosity towards and stereotyping of the opposite 
side (see Hobolt et al., 2018). But to what extent were these divisions reflected in the 2017 
election? This question is examined in the next section. 
















While the two major parties, the Conservatives and Labour, adopted seemingly similar 
positions on the Brexit question, the Brexit question clearly continued to divide voters. Despite 
the reluctance of the parties to make the election about Brexit, the issue nonetheless did have 
an impact on their electoral support. Heath and Goodwin’s (2017) analysis of constituency-
level data show that Conservatives made gains from the electoral decline of UKIP in Leave-
supporting areas, but lost in more Remain-supporting areas with large number of graduates and 
younger voters. There was also a slight tendency for Labour to perform better in Remain-
supporting constituencies (Heath and Goodwin, 2017). Jennings and Stoker, in their study of 
aggregate-level constituency data, however, reject the description of the 2017 election as a 
‘Brexit election’, since ‘the vote is better seen as a symptom of the longer-term bifurcation of 
politics; less revenge of the “Remainers” and more a continuing battle of mobilisation between 
cosmopolitan and non-cosmopolitan areas’ (Jennings and Stoker, 2017, p. 359).  
These patterns in constituency-level voting thus raise important questions about the salience of 
Brexit to individual-level voters, as well as a broader cosmopolitan/non-cosmopolitan divide 
in British politics. The Brexit referendum itself had demonstrated a stark demographic and 
value divide between younger, better educated and more cosmopolitan voters who voted 
overwhelming to remain in the EU, and older, less well-educated more socially conservative 
voters who favoured leaving (Hobolt, 2016). Attitudes towards immigration was one of the key 
issues that divided Remainers and Leavers, as the latter group saw Brexit as an opportunity to 
restrict immigration (Clarke et al., 2017; Hobolt, 2016).  
This divide is not particular to British politics. Many scholars have pointed to the increasing 
importance of a new dimension in European politics centred not around classic economic 
questions about redistribution and the role of the state, but rather on a cultural divide between 
openness to immigration, multiculturalism and international co-operation on the one hand and 
traditional cultural values, nationalism and euroscepticism on the other hand (see De Vries and 
Hobolt, 2012; De Vries and Marks, 2012). Although the emphasis is on ‘cultural’ attitudes, 
such attitudes may well, at least in part, be rooted in the structural changes to the globalized 
economy that has created both winners and losers (Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008). This divide has 
been given various labels in the literature, such as the integration–demarcation dimension 
(Kriesi et al., 2006, 2008), the cosmopolitan axis (Jennings and Stoker, 2017), and the 
transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks, 2018) and while there is no agreement on the exact 
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content of this divide (De Vries, 2017), it is regarded as distinct from the traditional economic 
left–right dimension and focused more on identity and cultural concerns.  
There is little doubt that the Brexit referendum heightened the salience of the cultural 
dimension of politics in ways that cut across the traditional economic and left–right dimension 
(Hobolt, 2016). So, the question is to what extent this cosmopolitan divide was also present in 
the general election, and whether the Brexit issue was salient to voters’ decision-making even 
when accounting for these factors. To examine this, we turn to individual-level data from the 
British Election Study’s post-election face-to-face survey (Fieldhouse et al., 2018). This 
dataset provides a nationally representative face-to-face survey on how people voted in the 
election, their socio-demographic characteristics and their political attitudes as well as how 
they voted in the 2016 referendum, and thus provides an excellent source for examining the 
drivers of voting behaviour. 
Our analysis focuses on the vote for the two major parties,2 with a vote for the incumbent 
Conservative Party as the reference category (the full details of the data and results can be 
found in the Appendix). First, we examine the demographic predictors of the Conservative 
vote. To the extent that the demographic divide of the Brexit referendum is replicated, we 
should see that younger voters and graduates would be far less likely to vote Conservative. We 
also examine the impact of ethnicity and social class identity on vote choice. Figure 2 shows 
the marginal effects based on a logit model of Conservative vote in the 2017 general election, 
with Labour vote as the reference category. It clearly shows that age was a significant factor in 
the general election – as it was in the referendum (Hobolt, 2016) – with voters over 65 years 
old 34 percentage points more likely to vote Conservative than voters below 35 years old. We 
also find that university graduates were 10 percentage points more likely to vote Labour than 
those with no qualifications. However, this educational divide is much less stark than in the 
referendum, perhaps is part due to the legacy of class divisions in electoral politics which meant 
that working class voters would traditionally vote Labour, while the better-educated middle 
class would vote Conservative (Evans and Tilley, 2017). We do observe that voters who self-
identify as working class (reference category) were still significantly more likely to vote 
Labour, compared to middle class voters and those without a class identity. Voters from ethnic 
minority backgrounds were also more likely to vote Labour.  
                                                 




Figure 2: Demographic Predictors of Conservative Vote 
Source: BES post-election survey 2017 (http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/). 
 
These individual-level demographic differences mirror the constituency-level differences 
between Labour-supporting urban areas with more diverse, younger and more educated voters 
and Conservative-voting smaller towns and rural areas, with older and less diverse populations 
(Jennings and Stoker, 2017). But does this mean that electoral behaviour in Britain had tilted 
towards the cosmopolitan axis in the 2017 election, and that economic attitudes were less 
relevant? And did Brexit play a role in shaping vote choices? 
To examine these questions, we fit a second model that – in addition to the demographic 
variables above – also includes a set of attitudinal variables and an item on vote choice in the 
2016 referendum. As mentioned above, there is no agreement on the main features of the 
‘cultural’ dimension of politics or the degree to which it is correlated with, or orthogonal to, 
traditional left–right attitudes towards politics (De Vries, 2017). Hence, as a starting point for 
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our analysis, we ran an exploratory factor analysis on a large set of attitudinal question items, 
covering both standard economic left–right items and questions on socially liberal versus 
socially conservative attitudes. The results show two main attitudinal dimensions that can be 
labelled as ‘economic’ and ‘cultural’. The economic items capture attitudes towards state 
intervention in the economy and redistribution,3 whereas the cultural items capture attitudes 
towards traditional values, crime, immigration and ethnic minorities.4 On the basis of this factor 
analysis, I created two factor scores representing the cultural and economic attitude 
dimensions, as well as including a question on whether the respondent voted Leave, Remain 
or abstained in the Brexit referendum. The results are shown in Figure 3.  
                                                 
3 Economic attitudes items include: ‘Private enterprise is the best way to solve Britain's economic 
problems’; ‘It is the government's responsibility to provide a job for everyone who wants one’; ‘Major 
public services and industries ought to be in state ownership’; and ‘Make much greater efforts to make 
people’s incomes more equal’ (see Fieldhouse et al., 2018). 
4 Cultural attitude items include; ‘Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional British 
values’; ‘People in Britain should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives’; ‘For some 
crimes, the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’; ‘Do you think immigration is good or bad 
for Britain's economy?’ and ‘And how do you feel about attempts to give equal opportunities to black 




Figure 3: Attitudinal Predictors of Conservative Vote 
Source: BES post-election survey 2017 (http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/). 
 
The results are striking. First, they clearly show that classic left–right economic attitudes are 
still the primary driver of vote choice in Britain. This should not be surprising given that post-
war party competition in Britain, and in most of Western Europe, has been organized around 
the economic left–right dimension. Moreover, given the nature of the election campaign where 
the two parties took very distinct positions on these economic issues – after two decades of 
ideological convergence – it is understandable economic left–right attitudes were also salient 
to voters (Evans and Tilley, 2017; Green and Hobolt, 2008). But it is nonetheless an important 
reminder that that attitudes concerning the role of the state in the economy and redistribution 
are still strongly correlated with vote choice. Cultural attitudes also matter, but less than 
economic ones. Interestingly, we can see that the Brexit vote was a very important determinant 
of vote choice, even when controlling for cultural attitudes and demographics. Someone who 
voted to Leave the EU in 2016 was 16 percentage points more likely to vote Conservative than 
someone who had voted Remain, holding other attitudes constant. This suggests that despite 
the reluctance of the major parties to offer distinct positions on Brexit, the referendum played 
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a role as Leavers flocked to the Conservatives and Remainers (perhaps more surprisingly) 
voted for Labour in larger numbers. One reason why a salient pro-EU/eurosceptic divide did 
not benefit smaller parties, as we have seen in the rest of Europe (see Hobolt and De Vries, 
2015), is Britain’s use of the first-past-the-post electoral system, which encourages voters to 
think more strategically about which party has a realistic chance of forming a government when 
casting a vote. Another reason is that issues other than Brexit appear to have been more 
important to a number of voters, notably traditional concerns about the economy and social 
services. 
In the next section, I examine the broader consequences of this Brexit election on British 
politics and UK-EU negotiations. 
III. Brexit Negotiations 
When Mrs May announced the snap general election in April 2017, she declared with reference 
to Brexit that ‘the country is coming together but Westminster is not’. As shown in Figure 1, 
however, there is little evidence to support the claim that the country is coming together, and 
the election result did not lead to greater unity over Brexit, in Westminster or in the general 
population. This polarization of public opinion along Brexit lines makes it more difficult for 
the government to agree on a negotiation position that will satisfy a large proportion of the 
electorate. Following the disappointing election result for Mrs May, only 34 per cent of voters 
thought her government was doing a good job handling Britain’s exit from the EU, compared 
with 57 per cent who thought they were doing a bad job.5 One of the reasons for the negative 
evaluation of the government’s performance, even among many Leavers, is the continued 
uncertainty surrounding the Prime Minister’s approach to Brexit. Her Cabinet has remained 
openly divided on the right balance between achieving the benefits of continued free trade with 
the European Union and avoiding a border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland on the one hand, and enforcing British priorities on restricting payments to the EU, 
ending freedom of movement and leaving the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice on 
the other hand. While the EU – led by the Commission’s negotiator Michel Barnier – has 
maintained a unified and consistent line throughout the negotiations, emphasizing the core 
principles that the UK cannot leave the Single Market and the Customs Union and maintain 
                                                 
5 Poll by Ipsos MORI, 18 July 2017. 
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frictionless trade and the benefits of membership, the British government has been accused of 
an unrealistic ‘have cake and eat it’ approach to the Brexit negotiations (Hagemann, 2018).  
It is not only the government that is in turmoil over the future shape of Britain’s relationship 
with the EU. Both the Labour Party and the Conservatives are fundamentally divided in 
Parliament over key aspects of how the UK’s relationship with the EU should be reshaped. A 
survey of MPs in late 2017 shows that within the Labour Party, the ordinary backbench MPs 
favour a softer approach to Brexit than their party leadership with 90 per cent of Labour MPs 
stating that membership of the Single Market is both possible outside the EU and compatible 
with honouring the referendum (Cowley and Wager, 2018). In contrast, a majority of 
Conservative MPs take a more hard-line approach to aspects of the Brexit negotiations than 
their government, with 74 per cent of Conservative MPs surveyed opposing the continued 
freedom of movement during a transition period, and 63 per cent saying they do not want any 
role for the ECJ after March 2019, both of which have been conceded to the EU by the British 
government in the discussion of transition arrangements.  
The UK general election can thus be said to have weakened the British government’s position 
in the negotiations, as it did little to provide more clarity on Britain’s position on the future 
UK–EU relationship and damaged Theresa May’s position both within her party and within 
parliament. Her weakness within the party – leading to her being described as a ‘dead woman 
walking’ in the aftermath of the election – has meant that she has little authority over the ‘hard 
Brexiteers’ within her Cabinet, and this makes it more difficult to compromise in the UK–EU 
Brexit negotiations. Moreover, her weakness within Parliament means that she is vulnerable to 
rebellions within her own ranks – also from Tory Remainers – and she needs the support of the 
hard-line DUP to ensure the survival of her minority government. This became abundantly 
clear in December 2017 when an agreement struck between Britain and the EU to solve the 
problem of the Irish border and move to the next phase of Brexit talks was thwarted at the very 
last minute by the DUP. An agreement was finally struck to move the Brexit negotiations to 
the second phase that involves the future relationship between the UK and the EU, but Mrs 
May continues to find herself performaing a delicate balancing act between hard-liners in her 






Less than a year after the historical referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU, Prime 
Minister May called the election to secure an increased majority for her government and a 
strong mandate for the Brexit negotiations. The surprising outcome of the election was a hung 
parliament, resulting in a minority government led by a weakened prime minister.  While Brexit 
was the apparent reason for the early election, it did not dominate the campaign, not least as 
the two major parties shared a very similar position on the Brexit issue, namely that the 
referendum outcome would be respected and that Britain would be leaving the EU without a 
second referendum. The fact that this Brexit election led to the strengthening of two-party 
politics – with the Conservatives and Labour winning the biggest combined share of the vote 
since the 1970s – is something of a conundrum. As a cross-cutting political issue, we might 
expect Brexit to lead to greater fragmentation of party politics (Hobolt and De Vries, 2015). 
Yet, instead the Conservative Party benefited from the fact that the Brexit vote allowed them 
to adopt a hard-line position on both Brexit and immigration. This resulted in the collapse of 
UKIP’s electoral appeal, as voters – especially older, socially conservative voters – flocked to 
the Conservatives (Mellon et al., 2018). The analysis also shows that Remain voters – 
especially younger socially-liberal graduates – voted in larger numbers for Labour. Some 
Remain voters may have voted Labour in the hope that the party would adopt a ‘softer’ 
approach to Brexit in office, while others were attracted to the party’s left-wing anti-austerity 
message. Our analysis reveals that the major parties’ distinct socio-economic policies were 
decisive for many voters. 
Overall, the election that was meant to unify the nation, and Parliament, after a divisive Brexit 
referendum did little to achieve that. The British public remained deeply divided on the issue 
of Brexit. The election also weakened the Prime Minister’s position, both within her party and 
within Parliament. The difficult policy choices involved in negotiating Britain’s exit from the 
European Union were thus compounded by an election that enfeebled the government and 








Table A1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Conservative vote 1,396 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Age groups 2,175 2.73 1.10 1 4 
Education groups 1,960 2.94 1.62 1 5 
Middle class ID 2,137 1.01 0.88 0 2 
White British 2,194 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Cultural dimension 1,708 0.00 0.83 –2 2 
Economic dimension 1,708 0.00 0.75 –2 2 




Table A2: Vote Choice Models 
 
  Demographic Model Full Model 
  Log odds SE Log odds SE 
Age (Reference: 18–34 years old)     
35–44 years old 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.28 
45–64 years old 0.89* 0.17 0.77* 0.22 
65+ years old 1.62* 0.19 1.27* 0.25 
Education (Reference: No qualification)     
Other qualification –0.01 0.18 0.01 0.23 
Degree education –0.49* 0.21 –0.23 0.29 
Class identity (Reference: working class)     
Middle class identification 1.44* 0.18 1.29* 0.23 
No class identification 1.10* 0.14 1.04* 0.19 
White British (Reference: Non-white) 1.25* 0.21 0.89* 0.26 
Cultural dimension   0.33* 0.12 
Economic dimension   1.75* 0.14 
Brexit vote (Reference: Remain)     
Voted leave   0.76* 0.19 
Did not vote   –0.15 0.34 
Constant –2.67* 0.29 –2.54* 0.36 
N 1,326 1,092 
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.35 
Source: British Election Study 2017 (Fieldhouse et al., 2018). 
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